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The New Anti-Intellectualism
In American Legal Education
By Francis A. Allen*

I
Legal education in the United States is passing through its winter of
discontent. Those who are new to the law schools-students and young
instructors-are likely to be unaware of how recently and precipitously the
present mood developed. Even those who have known the law schools
longer may by now have forgotten the confidence and euphoria that were
characteristic attributes of the schools until no more than a decade ago.,
Legal education, of course, has never lacked criticism, and the most
searching and pointed complaints were those generated within the schools
themselves. The "explosion" of interest in interdisciplinary studies at Columbia in the 1920's,l narrated by Brainerd Currie in his well known study;'
the realist movement; efforts to enlarge the scope of law school curricula,
such as the foundation-nurtured movement to institutionalize international legal studies after World War II-each reflected significant dissatisfactions with the law schools at various intervals in this century. The
dissatisfactions so expressed, however, rarely implied a loss of confidence
in the capacity of legal education to make large and indispensable contributions to our public life. On the contrary, these movements of reform
affirmed the importance and potential of law teaching and research; the
frustrations stemmed largely from a conviction that the capacities of legal
education were being underutilized. It need not be asserted that today this
* Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, University of Michigan. President, Association
of American Law Schools, 1976. Cornell College (Iowa) (A.B., highest honors, 1941); Northwestern University (LL.B., magna cum laude, 1941). Member of the Michigan Bar.
1. Actually, the present mood probably did not fully reveal itself until considerably later.
Professor Robert Stevens in 1971 could still summon "two cheers" for traditional legal education. Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 405 (1971). His study begins with the following observation: "If one ignores the
increasing student rumblings of the last five years, there is much to justify the satisfaction
felt by many with the American contribution to legal education. Almost every other aspect
of the indigenous legal system has been subjected to severe criticism and unfavorable comparisons. In contrast, American legal education has received a favorable press." It is possible that
Professor Stevens underestimated the strength of the critical current.
2. The description was that of Karl Llewellyn. See Allen, History, Empirical Research,
and Law Reform, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 335 (1956).
3. Currie, The Materials of Law Study, Parts I and 11, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331 (1951); Part
II, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1955).
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confidence has been wholly destroyed or is incapable of reinvigoration; but
it surely has been weakened.
Brainerd Currie, who among his other distinctions became a leading
commentator on American legal education, left a body of writings that
provides a convenient bench mark to measure how far the present malaise
has proceeded.' In a sprightly essay published just twenty years ago, Professor Currie predicted that there would be no dramatic changes in law
school training in the half-century following 1956.1 The changes, he
thought, would be "molecular" rather than "molar;" they would be the
cumulative product of individual efforts, not the results of institutional
upheaval. Professor Currie could contemplate his prognostication "without
dismay,"' 6 not because this most critical of men was complacent about the
achievements of law schools in the 1950's,7 but because he believed that
the essential conditions and assumptions of American legal education were
sound and sufficient to sustain a process of constructive development.
Such was also the conviction of most other thoughtful persons in the law
schools at the time.
The modem discontents with legal education differ from those of even
the recent past, both in degree and in kind. It is well to identify the sources
of contemporary dissatisfactions and to be aware of dangers implicit in
them. Although it requires some hardihood to say so in the present climate
of opinion, nothing in the historical record justifies the assumption of
abject failure that today is frequently brought to discussions of legal
education. On the contrary, the record includes remarkable successes.
During this century, legal scholarship, first through the compilation of
great treatises and the production of a law review literature and later
through efforts at legislative codification and restatement, went far to
rationalize and systematize disorderly common-law doctrine in the
private-law fields. It would be difficult to identify any other university
department concerned with the social disciplines that achieved a more
palpable and far-reaching social impact than that of the law schools in this
particular. At least equally important and even more surprising was the
influence of the law schools on our public law. It is not easy to name an
important development in these areas during the past two generations that
was not first advanced or cultivated in a law school classroom or a law
review article. During this period a steady stream of young people fresh
from the law schools entered the legal profession. If it is true, as is frequently asserted, that lawyers create problems as well as solve them, it is
4. In addition to the study cited in the previous note, Professor Currie's writings on legal
education include the following: The Place of Law in the Liberal Arts Curriculum, 5 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 428 (1953); Law and the Future: Legal Education, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 258 (1956); Book
Review, 62 HARv. L. Rzv. 1252 (1949).
5. Currie, Law and the Future: Legal Education, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 258, 263 (1956).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 271.
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also true that in the succession of crises that have shaken American society
in the twentieth century, lawyers of intelligence, flexibility, technical skill
and wisdom came forward to serve and advance the public interest. If
failures of professional responsibility are to be laid at the door of the law
schools, the qualities of mind and character revealed in these more inspiring performances ought also to be seen, in part, as the fruits of the law
school experience.
These observations are not advanced in a spirit of complacent satisfaction. Failures have abounded. Each observer will frame his own indictment. The law schools have contributed all too little to the avoidance of
an impending breakdown of American judicial administration and have,
indeed, sometimes revealed little awareness that such a crisis exists. Until
recently, legal scholarship has been insufficiently concerned with improving the delivery of legal services, not only to the impoverished but also to
the great bulk of the population. Some believe that not enough is being
done in the schools to develop that educated compassion necessary, at least
in some areas of practice, for the lawyer to serve fully the interests of his
clients.8 This and much more may be counted as liabilities. Nevertheless,
the achievements of American legal education are real and substantial.
This patent fact gives rise to the suspicion that the precipitous loss of
confidence may be the product of something more than failures in educational performance. Social facts can alter rapidly in these times, but moods
and ideology may alter even more rapidly. If the present deflated views of
American legal education are in significant degree the product of factors
other than the actual performance of the law schools, it is well that we
know it. Knowing it, we may be able to evaluate more intelligently proposals brought forward in these times for the future of legal education.
Contemporary attitudes toward American legal education are being expressed at a time of endemic loss of confidence in our social and political
institutions. This loss of security extends to virtually all aspects of our
collective life. In the opening lines of a recent book, Robert Nesbit has
written: "Periodically in Western history twilight ages make their appearance. Processes of decline and erosion of institutions are more evident than
those of genesis and development."' Shadows become exaggerated at twilight, and appraisals made at such a time may be distorted by a malaise
that has deeper causes than the performance of the particular institution
under scrutiny.
Perhaps the primary danger for legal education in this twilight interval
is that we may be induced to abandon our higher purposes and accept
aspirations that are too modest, 0 whether viewed from the perspective of
8. Shaffer and Redmount, Lessons Law Schools Don't Teach, CHANGE 50 (September,
1976).
9. R. NESBrr, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY v (1975).
10. Compare: "Retreat from the major to the minor, the communal to the personal, and
from the objective to the subjective is commonplace." Id.
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student capacities and commitments, the more effective practice of the
profession, the acquiring of socially useful knowledge, or the more effective
criticism and reconstruction of institutional practices.The loss of confidence in intellectually and humanistically motivated law training prepared
the way for the rise of a new anti-intellectualism in legal education, new
not in kind or quality, but in the breadth and intensity of its expression
both in and out of the law schools. The new anti-intellectualism insists on
what my colleague, Paul Carrington, has described as "instantaneous
practicality;" it is impatient with any educational activity that does not
promise an immediate and discernable payoff in private law practice. It is
concerned primarily with the "how," not the "why." It displays small
interest in the substantive issues that confront this society. It reveals a
narcissistic fixation on the techniques of the law office and the courts. It
views askance the role of the law schools as critics of the law and as sources
of new law. It gives short shrift to the obligation of the law school, as an
integral part of the university, to discover and communicate new knowledge. It scoffs at "philosophy" as wasting students' time or as incapacitating them for practical affairs. It is not an interest in improved "skills"
training in legal education that identifies the new anti-intellectualism; nor
is it the desire to equip students for a more humane and effective career
at the bar. The essence of the new anti-intellectualism is, rather, the
narrowing of interests, the rejection of intellectual and humanistic concerns, the militant assumption that the test of an educational endeavor is
its impact on the law firm's ledger. It is characterized by confident but
wholly unsubstantiated judgments about the contributions of particular
educational experiences to professional proficiency."
The attack on intellect is in no way confined to the law schools in these
times. Indeed, a weakening of faith in the power of intellect might well be
regarded as one of the distinguishing characteristics of the modern era. The
rise of sciences of human behavior has attacked the primacy of reason as
a determinant of human activity and has given precedence to feeling,
habit, social structure, unconscious drives and manifold other noncognitive factors in human existence. In the political arena, intellect is
required to bear a heavy burden of condemnation. Reason, it is said, has
produced a science that threatens humanity and an industrialism that
erodes the physical bases of human survival. It has stunted human development by neglecting those aspects of personality that require the cultivation of emotion and aesthetic enjoyment." So thorough-going has been the
11. Cf. New Admission Rules Proposed for Federal District Courts, 61 A.B.A.J. 945
(1975); Givan, Indiana's Rule 13: It Doesn't Invite Conformity. It Compels Competency, 3
LEARN. AND LAW 16 (Summer, 1976). And see AALS SPECIAL COMM. ON ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, REPORT ON THE CLARE COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR RuLEs OF ADMISSION TO THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS IN THE SECOND Cmcurr (1976).
12. Allen, Mr. Justice Holmes and "The Life of the Mind," 52 BOST. U.L. REV. 229, 233
(1972).
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assault on "the life of the mind" that those who value it have sought such
comfort as can be drived from Justice Holmes' plaintive observation:
3
"[Tjo know is not less than to feel.'
One of the more remarkable aspects of the current assault on intellect
is that it perhaps derives more significantly from within the universities
than from without. Certainly the most eloquent denunciations have been
launched from college campuses. In the confusions of the late 1960's, a
group of younger faculty members and students at a middle-western university came together under the proud banner, "Brains Distrust." Similar
movements rose and flourished for a season on other campuses. The phenomenon had its hilarious aspects. Rarely has there been launched such a
syllogistic attack on reason. Some of the adherents were seriously engaged
in scholarly undertakings and, presumably, were dedicated to the devices
of rationality in their scientific and professional lives. Their hostility to
disciplined intelligence was confined largely to their public statements
(the more public the better). The effort to have one's cake and eat it too
has not been restricted, of course, to such groups; and one cannot positively
assert that this dalliance with schizophrenia resulted in lasting harm to
those who indulged in it. The effects on their students are more problematic. The students heard the uncompromising attacks on the life of the
mind, but their teachers did not disclose-certainly they did not defend-the values that they routinely embraced and employed in the library
and the laboratory.
The point being made is that, in significant part, the origins of the
malaise now being experienced in the law schools are to be found, not in
legal education's sins of omission and commission, but in events and cultural movements that typify our entire social life. Perceiving that is necessary if one is to make realistic appraisal of the present status and needs of
legal education, and it in no way challenges the necessity for intelligent
innovation in the circumstances of the late twentieth-century world. Further analysis of the broad social influences affecting the rise of the new
anti-intellectualism in legal education will be left to those better equipped
to identify and evaluate them. 4 Not all the origins of this phenomenon,
13. From a lecture entitled "The Profession of the Law" delivered February 17, 1866,
reprinted in M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 31 (1943).
14. There is another broad social phenomenom that one is tempted to associate with the
new anti-intellectualism. In his classic study, Professor Currie pointed to the devastating
impact of Jacksonian egalitarianism in the second quarter of the last century on an emerging
American tradition of unviersity learning in law training. See Currie, The Materials of Law
Study, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331, 359-361 (1951). In 1830 Judge Tayloe Lomax lamented the
decline in quality of legal education at the University of Virginia: "Their [the students']
demand for the law is as for a trade-the means the most expeditious and convenient, for
their future livelihood." Quoted id. at 361. Modem egalitarianism has similarly confronted
the universities. Impatience has been expressed whenever standards inaccessible to the poorly
qualified are advanced. Insistence on such standards has been interpreted as evidence of
unworthy exclusionary purposes. It is interesting that Theodore Dwight of Columbia Univer-
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however, require such analysis; some are closer to home. Origins of the new
anti-intellectualism also reside in the legal profession, in the law faculties
and among law students.
II
In 1886 Christopher Columbus Langdell proclaimed: "If law be not a
science, a university will best consult its own dignity in declining to teach
it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be
learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices."' 5 Thirty-five
years later, Thorsten Veblen, apparently unimpressed by the Langdellean
claim to scientific status for the law, observed that "law schools belong in
the modern university no more than a school of fencing or dancing."' 6
From the time that responsibility for professional legal training in the
United States became predominantly that of the universities, a state of
tension has characterized the relations between the law schools and the
practicing bar. There is nothing surprising or necessarily alarming about
this fact. What is surprising is that, for the most part, this inevitable
tension has proved creative and beneficial to the interests of both the law
schools and the profession.
The advantages of the division of functions between the law schools and
the profession, characteristic of American legal education, have been apparent both to the parties involved and also to foreign observers of American law training. 7 For the profession, the schools have provided battalions
of graduates adept in at least certain professional skills-young persons of
sufficient attractiveness to have induced vigorous competition among lawyers and law firms to retain their services. However lacking the graduates
may have been in technical proficiency, they, for the most part, have
shown considerable facility in acquiring the necessary skills when placed
in the arena of private practice. Many lawyers left their schools imbued
with motivations for public service, and much of the constructive achievement of the profession can fairly be attributed to the interests and examples of great law teachers as perceived by embryo lawyers. However dubious some lawyers may at times have felt about certain interests of law
faculties, legal research emanating from the schools has served the
profession well. 8
sity offered strenuous objections to the introduction of the case method, in part on the ground
that it was unsuited to the "great and important class of men of average ability which exists
and will always exist in the profession." Quoted in Stevens, supra note 1, at 425.
15. Address delivered November 5, 1866, 3 L.Q. REv. 123, 124 (1887).
16. Quoted in Stevens, supra note 1, at 427, n.12.
17. As early as 1895, Lord James Bryce stated that he did "not know if there is anything
in which America has advanced more beyond the mother country than in the provision she
makes for legal education." 2 THE AmRucAN COMMONWEALTH (3d ed. 1887), quoted in Stevens,
supra note 1, at 405.
18. Indeed, there is ground for complaint that law school research has been too much
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This symbiotic relationship between the schools and theprofession has
also served the interests of legal education. However constricting the influence of bar examinations and of alumni scrutiny, the schools have enjoyed
a significant freedom in curriculum planning, experimentation with teaching methods and research objectives." This freedom is the envy of many
who teach law in other countries that adhere to the Anglo-American legal
system, and it is the condition indispensable to the continued health and
vigor of the relationship between university and profession. There are other
contributions that the relationship has made to the schools. Contacts with
a functioning profession, the testing of ideas (however unsystematically)
against the actuality of an on-going system, provide the law schools with
a kind of "reality principle," an advantage apparently lacking at times in
some other departments of the university that are involved in the study of
social processes.
Yet it would be unrealistic and unwise to ignore the tension. Stress is
an inherent feature of university-based professional training. This is true
in part because, as an integral segment of a university, the law school
assumes obligations and commitments that extend beyond the pragmatic
interests of the practicing profession and that at times may conflict with
them. The university law school inherits a knowledge-finding function and
a critical function. The objects of criticism will on occasion be the law and
lawyers. The focus of concern must encompass areas of social interest that
have great importance but that sometimes are far removed from the practical concerns of the practicing bar. These facts are well understood by many
lawyers, and this conception of legal education has received not only the
tolerance but also the aggressive support of enlightened members of the
bar. The support has been based both on an appreciation of the social
importance of having law schools perform these broad functions and on the
calculation that such schools are most likely to produce the best qualified
lawyers.
There is evidence that the tolerance on which this enlarged conception
dominated by professional concerns and too much viewed by law faculties as a secondary
adjunct to classroom teaching. The consequences are a still largely undeveloped potential in
socio-legal fact inquiry and a continuing tendency toward bad conscience when the research
undertaken does not directly enrich teaching, however socially important it may prove to be.
19. The constricting influence of fiscal stringency, however, now as in the past, has seriously impinged on the freedom of the schools and limited their educational capacities and
aspirations. Although many individual lawyers have provided splendid financial support for
their alma maters, the legal profession as a whole has done little to provide a rational system
of support for the schools. Brainerd Currie wrote: "On what grounds, however, can the
profession justify a demand that the public assume the whole cost of preparing young men
to perform work which, whatever its societal implications, has as its immediate object the
production of income for themselves and the firms that employ them? My hope for the future
is that the profession will continue to provide all that training which it can provide more
efficiently than the universities, and to bear the cost of doing so." Currie, Law and the Future:
Legal Education, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 258, 268 (1956).
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of legal education depends is eroding in some segments of the bar and the
bench. The evidence does not consist of the criticism of traditional educational methods and the pressure for reforms. Many lawyers, like many law
teachers, favor a more clinically oriented training and believe that movement by the schools in that direction will contribute to an enhanced professional competence and responsibility. Such criticism creates a dialogue of
the kind that is indispensable to the processes of evaluation and adaptation essential to the survival of any social institution. The evidence of
eroding tolerance may be found in the note of acrid hostility being sounded
in the public statements of some lawyers, the rejection of dialogue, and a
view of legal education largely confined to the narrowest of professional
interests. It is not clear what fraction of the bar and bench share these
attitudes, but the attitudes appear to be gaining increasing support among
the practicing bar. There has always been a current of similar feeling
within the bar. Not for many years, however, has it been so widely and
uninhibitedly expressed as in the period since the late 1960's.
The last decade has been a period of discontent for the bar as well as
for the schools. The bar has felt the lash of public criticism, and there has
been a typically American tendency on the part of some of its members to
attribute its difficulties to educational failures. The apparent revolution
in the attitudes of the younger generation caused deep anxiety, and some
lawyers associated the behavior of the young with the influence of the universities and university law schools. The staggering burdens imposed on
the courts raised concerns about the courtroom competence of many lawyers, even though the assumption that the problems faced by the courts
are created primarily by the incompetence of young lawyers has never been
validated. Some lawyers believe that an increasing distance is developing
between the interests and sympathies of some law professors and the practicing bar. A few lawyers resent the leadership of legal scholars in the
movements that produced "no-fault" legislation in the fields of personal
2
injury and domestic relations and the reform of probate procedures 0
Whatever the causes, the dissatisfactions with university-based law
training have been animated and given new and caustic expression. The
thrust of these expressions is toward legal education of constricted scope
and lowered aspirations.
III
Sources of the new anti-intellectualism in legal education are also to be
found in the law schools themselves. Law teachers, like members of other
university faculties, are sensitive to those characteristics of Professor Nes-

20. A fuller discussion of these matters may be found in Allen, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with Legal Education, 62 A.B.A.J. 447 (1976).
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bit's "twilight age" that produce uncertainty and tentativeness in the
pursuit of intellectual goals. Some have had their confidence in the traditional methodologies of legal education shaken but have as yet been unable
to devise alternative techniques that are comparably successful in achieving the intellectual and humanistic ends of law teaching. It is, however,
student attitudes that have most profoundly affected the practices and
assumptions of their teachers. At no time will a teacher worthy of the name
be indifferent to the expectations of his students; and in an age of
consumerism, student demands and dissatisfactions are likely to be given
even greater attention."' Law teachers have reacted in different ways to the
anti-intellectualism that pervades many students' attitudes. Some have
found the student demands to be consistent with their own vision of law
school training. Others have succumbed after token resistance. Still others
continue to resist. Some of those who adhere to the values of intellectually
rigorous and humanistically oriented law teaching have encountered exceptional difficulties in achieving effective communication with their students-difficulties that leave both them and their students bemused and
dissatisfied.
However these dynamics are to be weighed, certain consequences are
clear. One is that intellectual demands on students in some law school
classrooms today are less stringent than they were a decade ago. This is
not because of a decline in the intellectual quality of American law faculties; on the contrary, there has never been another time in which so many
persons of exceptional ability occupied positions in the law schools. Nor is
the issue the decline of the "case method" or of "socratic" dialogue. Whatever the teaching method, however, there must be intellectual dialogue of
some sort if intellectual skills are to be honed. Moreover, the diaglogue
must be sustained and intense. Few will mourn the passing of the savagery
that sometimes defaced the teaching of the past, but little can be said for
a pedagogical exercise that permits a student to leave the classroom
believing that a slovenly effort at analysis or generalization satisfies professional and intellectual standards. Involved in the question of intellectual
rigor is the problem of value analysis. Analyzing values is the essence of
humanistic education in any discipline, but a classroom discussion of values unaccompanied by demands for clear and responsible thought may
quickly degenerate into propaganda or sentimentalism.
Consideration needs to be given also to the relations, if any, between the
movement for enlarged clinical and "skills" training and the rise of antiintellectualism in American legal education. As Dean Roger C. Cramton
has rightly pointed out, the impact of the clinical movement on the law
schools is not adequately reflected by the numbers of students enrolled at
any one time in courses designated as "clinical." 2 The fraction of graduat21.
22.

Cramton, Competency for What?, 3 LEARN. AND LAw 64, 67 (Summer, 1976).
Id. at 66.
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ing students who have had some substantial contact with courtroom litigation, for example, whether in courses, extracurricular activities or parttime employment, has grown enormously in the course of the last generation. No doubt, the clinical perspective has also influenced the teaching
of traditional classroom courses.3 The issues raised-by the new antiintellectualism cannot be characterized as a conflict between clinical and
classroom instruction. The incontestable fact is that both clinical training
and traditional instruction can be trivial or profound, can serve broad
social and humanistic goals or the narrowest of ends. Indeed, properly
conceived and executed, clinical programs advance the higher educational
aspirations and support the objectives of classroom instruction. The student is given, among other things, an opportunity under field conditions
to test his command of analytical skills and a broader experience with
which to evaluate the legal norms and the values expressed in the administration of justice."
Nevertheless, candor requires it to be said that certain aspects of the
clinical movement have contributed to the rise of the new antiintellectualism. Not surprisingly, the movement to introduce clinical experiences into legal education has encountered opposition and inertia; understandably, the clinicians have felt frustration and disappointment. It is
probably true that the greatest obstacle before the clinical movement has
not been the opposition of the law teachers who object to it on basic
intellectual or pedagogical grounds. More important have been the doubts
of other established faculty members, who are by no means unsympathetic
to the asserted ends of clinical training but who are bewildered about how
to evaluate the quality of clinical programs and instructors, how to determine what features of traditional education should be sacrificed to make
way for it and how to pay for it.
The resistance to clinical proposals encountered by their supporters and
the difficulties of law faculties in fitting these programs into prevailing
assumptions about the measures of academic quality, tenure, promotion
of clinical personnel and the like have produced a spate of unhappy consequences. Many clinical instructors, naturally enough, are resentful, and
some have felt themselves to be pariahs in the law school environment.,
Some clinical instructors, believing that clinical education in the law
schools does not afford a promising career line, have left these programs,
and often their leaving has reduced the quality of the clinical training.
Others have made strident public statements that not only proclaim the
virtues of clinical training but also appear to attack the values of intellectually and humanistically based legal education. Some of the statements
23. Id.
24. Pepe, The Clinical Law Experiment: Goals, Methods, and Problems, 20 LAW QUAD.
NOTES 12 (Spring, 1976).
25. Oliphant, When Will CliniciansBe Allowed to Join the Club?, 3 LEARN. AND LAW 34
(Summer, 1976).
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reinforce the less thoughtful attacks emanating from the bar in recent
years, and, indeed, often can hardly be distinguished in content from
them. This similarity is doubly unfortunate because it tends to give academic respectability to the least defensible criticisms of the law schools,
and also because the kind, quality and motivation of clinical training
espoused by the academic clinicians are likely to be very different from
that contemplated by the less responsible critics in the profession.
And then there is the problem of money. Among the most attractive
features of clinical education is the promise of close personal contact between instructor and student; but it is this characteristic that, because of
costs, seriously limits the availability and growth of these programs. In the
last decade, more than one American law school, caught up in the enthusiasm for clinical training but unable or unwilling to allocate enough resources to support it, has nevertheless placed programs in operation. In a
few cases academic credit was given for "field experiences" that were unsupervised by the schools and about which the faculties were almost totally
ignorant. Ironically, such abdications of responsibility have been publicly
represented as giant steps forward in the training of young lawyers.
Finally, there are certain features of the clinical education movement as
it has evolved that give rise to serious, though more problematic, concerns.
One feature is the lack of hospitality shown by some clinicians toward the
systematic use of empirical inquiry designed to place the policy of the law
on a firmer factual basis. To be sure, leaders of the clinical movement have
displayed interest in utilizing those trained in the psychological disciplines
to assist in defining and measuring the various aspects of lawyer "competence." One misses, however, a comparable concern for the substantive
issues that our civilization, and hence the law, must encounter in the years
immediately ahead. The clinical movement grew out of a reformist tradition, and that tradition encompassed concerns that go beyond the methodologies of legal education or the techniques of private law practice, important as these matters are. The apparent isolation of many in clinical education from interdisciplinary inquiry directed to great issues soon to challenge the law may contribute to one of two possible postures. To the extent
that reformist zeal in the movement encompasses more than the problems
of law practice narrowly conceived, the movement may be founded on an
ideology and policy imperatives that are fallible and that remain unexamined or, indeed, undisclosed. A second possibility is that concern with
substantive social problems may decline further or disappear, and the
movement may be largely confined to the niceties of lawyer techniques.
Either consummation would represent a loss of educational opportunity
and quality.
IV
In his remarkably prescient lectures entitled The Law in Quest of Itself,
Lon Fuller wrote over a generation ago:

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

The problem addresses itself finally to the law student ....
Shall he
search out the professor who can expound "the existing law" . . . ? Or
shall his preference lie for the man who can impart an insight into the
shifting ethical background of the law, a background against which "the
law as it is" appears as an accidental configuration without lasting importance? A similar problem of choice confronts him in directing his own
studies. The way in which the law student decides these questions
transcends in importance its effects on his own career, for, through the
subtle pressures he exerts on his instructors to teach him what he thinks
he ought to be taught, he exercises an influence on legal education-and
indirectly on the law-much greater than he has any conception of."6
Consideration of the contribution of modem student attitudes to the new
anti-intellectualism in American legal education requires that several preliminary observations be made. First, none of the attitudes are unique to
students. Without exception, the attitudes originate in the larger society
and constitute evidence of broad cultural trends. When expressed by students, however, they acquire a particular importance in the educational
process; they condition the communication between teachers and students
and effectively influence the goals and achievements of legal education.
Next, it is by no means true that these tendencies of thought were unheard
of in previous student generations. What is distinctive about the present
stituation is the intensity of their widespread expression in recent years.
Finally, it needs always to be borne in mind that many of the attitudes
are closely related to other student characteristics that often reveal a generosity of spirit and humanitarian concern-characteristics that are both
attractive and of great social value. Nevertheless, as Professor Fuller's
comment suggests, the expectations and proclivities of the students require
candid consideration, for they constitute a major dimension in any appraisal of the modern status of American legal education and its likely
future evolution.
In the early 1960's, a motion picture entitled Morgan enjoyed a vogue
with American young people. It appeared to capture a sense of the predicament in which they found themselves. At one point in the film occurred
an exchange, which, according to best recollection, went something as
follows:
"Morgan, you'd better watch it!"
"I would, but I can't find it."
Young people growing to maturity in that era experienced just such insecurity. Whatever "it" was that could provide a secure basis upon which to
construct lives or could even advance understanding of the terrible perils
that lurked on all sides, "it" could not be found. Nor, since older persons
were experiencing similar uncertainties, was it possible to condemn the
26.
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young for their confusion. They had grown to maturity in the cold war with
the possibility of atomic holocaust never far from consciousness, and the
rapidly intensifying struggle in Vietnam was raising somber premonitions.
Confused uncertainty experienced at such a pitch breeds tensions that
cannot be endured for long. So as the 1960's progressed, it was perhaps
inevitable that the youthful style should alter and become characterized
by the militant assertion of certitudes. Many people in a position to observe the student generations in the closing years of the decade were able
to detect an unfulfilled "quest for certainty" going forward under the cloak
of rhetoric and dogmatism. One observer asserted that the students were
expressing "panic disguised as moral superiority."27 It is not a necessary
conclusion that, for these reasons, the student critique of American institutions and of adult leadership wholly lacked point and validity. What can
be said is that the student attitudes were antithetical to an intellectually
and humanistically based legal education; for these attitudes, or many of
them, required the closing of minds.
The quest for certainty at the height of student activism most frequently
expressed itself in the insistence that teaching should proceed from certain
given political premises, assumptions completely understood in advance
and admitting of no challenge. Acquiring the practical techniques necessary to implement those premises was seen as the principal purpose of
university education.
As the sixties made way for the new decade, the insistence on political
orthodoxy considerably abated, and a new openness became evident in the
classroom. Yet the demands for certainty continue to be expressed in other
ways. There is nothing new about the appetite of many students for propositions in black-letter print. Nor can it be intimated that students' demands for more practice-oriented training represent nothing more than the
lack of intellectual fortitude. Nevertheless, the insistence of many students
on "instantaneous practicality" often seems more strident today than at
many times in the past. Conversations with students frequently reveal
acute discomfort with the notion that practice itself is a learning experience and that some things can be better learned in the period following
graduation than in the law school. These insecurities have provided and
continue to provide resistance to a conception of legal education sufficiently broad to satisfy the manifold obligations of a university law school.
A second set of student attitudes, springing from the hedonism of modem life, has had an even clearer impact on university education. There has
developed a widely held conviction in our culture that individuals possess
a kind of natural right not to experience pain. When pain is felt, the
reactions are often indignation and bewilderment. These assumptions
manifest themselves in student reactions to the phenomenon of tension in
27.
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law school education. Tensions can be painful, and they abound in professional training. Many modern students, having been denied the knowledge
that tensions may be normal and inevitable incidents of the educational
experience, conclude that the pain they feel is abnormal. Pain creates selfdoubts, because it is seen as evidence of personal deficiency or of illness.
It also produces resentment against the institution and the educational
process that engender it.
Closely related is the invincible conviction of many students that learning under pressure is not only inefficient and difficult but also impossible.
Perhaps this conviction underlies the feeling of some students that being
called on in class and subjected to challenge by the instructor and classmates is somehow undignified and demeaning. If it is assumed that the
tensions of classroom interrogation disqualify the exchange from serving as
a learning experience, it may well be seen simply as aggression against
personality and comfort. These beliefs are so deeply entrenched that they
withstand convincing demonstration to the contrary. Surely not only history but contemporary experience reveal that profound learning is possible
in conditions of considerable pressure and that this is so much the normal
mode that pressures at some level, whether engendered internally or externally, may be seen as indispensable conditions of the learning process.
When Dr. Samuel Johnson was asked how he came to acquire his command of Latin, he replied: "My master whipped me very well. Without
that, Sir, I should have done nothing."
One scarcely needs to espouse the revival of corporal punishment as a
teaching device to protest the educational ideology that has pervaded the
lives of many university students. The "learning is fun" ideologues have
slain their tens of thousands. Learning, in fact, is pain, at least in those
aspects of it concerned with the indispensable discipline of basic drill.
Paradoxically, learning confers profound satisfactions, and the intellectual
life is a kind of play. The pleasures, however, cannot be achieved without
experiencing the pains. Modern technology has not discovered a short-cut
to Parnassus.
Like many other tendencies that do not withstand analysis, students'
attitudes nevertheless point to problems that are real. It is true that since
the inundation of law schools with applications for admission, competitive
pressures have escalated, and student insecurity produced by an apparently declining job market have added further to their intensity. These
pressures have reached seriously counter-productive levels in some institutions. The situation challenges the ingenuity and compassion of law faculties. Given the difficulty of the challenge, it is not surprising that the
28. Quoted by J. WAIN, SAMUEL JOHNSON 24 (1974). The author adds: "It is quite arguable
that this is true; a subject like Latin, which requires endless attention to detail and continual
effort of memory, was probably never learned without coercion of some kind; certainly the
disappearance of Latin and Greek from English schools has exactly kept pace with the
obsolescence of the cane."
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ingenuity of faculties has sometimes proved insufficient and that measures
that have been adopted compromise the essentials of sound education.
The relations of law faculties to their students in these times cannot be
characterized in a word. The student attitudes described above do not
characterize all students and probably do not characterize any students all
the time. Most people who have taught in the present decade will testify
to the presence of many students of the highest capacities and the most
attractive personal characteristics. Yet there are periods-and the present
appears to be one-in which the cultural climate is not propitious for the
cultivation of intellectual and humanistic values. At such a time, teachers,
if they are to serve their important function, have the uncomfortable obligation of resisting, in some measure, the main tendencies of the age.2 9
Resisting creates dissonance in their relations with some students, and
dissonance is particularly distressing to conscientious teachers who have
always relied on a sympathetic bond with their students as an avenue of
communication and as a means for mutual learning. Happily, there are
indications that the dissonance is lessening. In any event, the only alternative available to the instructor is default and capitulation.
V
The preservation and extension of an intellectually-based and
humanistically-motivated legal education is the greatest challenge facing
American law schools. Although attaining this objective will require resolving a host of subsidiary issues-methods of instruction, the length of law
school training, new systems of funding the research and educational programs-we should not permit debate of these issues to distract us from the
primary concern. In seeking this objective it would be highly imprudent
and irresponsible to ignore the felt needs now being given vigorous expression by students and practicing lawyers. It seems inevitable that more
systematic attention will be given to skills training in the future than in
the past. It seems equally clear that the evolution of legal specialties and
the demand for continuing post-graduate education will add to the scope
and complexity of the American system of professional legal training.
These new demands raise questions of method and allocation of functions between school and profession. They will not constitute a threat to
the mission of university-based legal education unless they lead to the
sacrifice of other vital functions and lower aspirations for intellectual quality and for service to the larger society. What we have to fear is a narrowing
of minds and concerns. We can accept, with only slight emendation, the
proposition formulated by John Stuart Mill over a century ago: "As often
as a study is cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw narrow conclu29. The essay of the late Jerome Frank, On Holding Abe Lincoln's Hat, may be relevant
in this context. B. FRANK, A MAN'S REACH 3 (1965).
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sions ....
The only security against narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a person is not likely to be a good political
economist who is nothing else." 0 For the phrase "good political economist"
let the sentence read "good lawyer."
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